Concerns About Liquidity, Buy‑Backs and Potential Exit Liquidity
Hello GMX community,
I’ve been following the recent governance discussions and proposals to use protocol fees for open‑market GMX buy‑backs. As a long‑term supporter of the protocol, I felt compelled to share some research and perspective on why aggressively buying back GMX may not serve the broader community as intended.
1. GMX liquidity is razor thin. GMX is listed on a number of centralized exchanges, but actual depth is modest: Binance – the deepest venue – has roughly USD 83 k of bids and asks within ±2 % of the current price; most other CEXs offer just a few thousand dollars of depth, and combined daily volume across all CEXs is only in the low millionscoingecko.com. On decentralized exchanges the situation is worse; the largest Uniswap V3 pool (Arbitrum) holds around USD 160 k on each side of the ±2 % band, while most pools have less than USD 3 k of liquiditycoingecko.com. Any sale of more than a few tens of thousands of dollars would move the price significantly.
2. The token supply is highly concentrated. According to on‑chain analytics, the top ten wallets hold over 80 % of GMX, with the top 50 wallets holding more than 94 %. A single individual has publicly held around 200–237 k GMX, and other large wallets contain 500–700 k GMX each. In other words, a handful of actors control most of the circulating supply, while the free float is tiny.
3. Buy‑backs have been offset by large whale sales. Data posted in the “Dynamic BBD Adjustment” thread shows that the Buy‑Back & Distribute (BBD) program has repurchased about 1.6 million GMX since launch. Of this, roughly 933 k GMX was compounded, 408 k was sold, and 288 k remained dormant. More importantly, during the same period the protocol experienced three major sell‑offs: a 300 k GMX whale dump, a ~500 k GMX sale after a v1 exploit, and a ~400 k GMX sale due to price manipulation. These sales total about 1.2 million GMX, effectively cancelling out the buy‑backsgov.gmx.io. In other words, the program has so far served more as exit liquidity for large holders than as a net reduction of supply.
4. Illiquid whales are essentially trapped. Because GMX’s order books are so shallow, any whale holding 200 k–500 k tokens would need weeks or months to exit without crashing the price. Instead of trying to solve this by artificially boosting price via buy‑backs, we should acknowledge that large holders are locked in by the very illiquidity that underpins the token’s value. Using millions of dollars of protocol fees to provide them with liquidity creates perverse incentives and diverts funds from growth.
5. A better path forward. Buy‑backs can momentarily boost price, but they don’t address the underlying issues of low trading volume, concentrated supply and limited product differentiation. I believe the community’s long‑term interests would be better served by:
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Investing fees into product development, marketing and partnerships that increase volume and demand.
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Improving transparency around treasury use and buy‑back execution.
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Exploring ways to broaden token ownership and reduce dependence on a few large stakers.
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Focusing on sustainable APR in ETH (real yield), rather than giving out more GMX that is quickly sold.
GMX has built an innovative protocol, but tokenomics tinkering won’t fix fundamental issues. Continuous buy‑backs risk becoming an “exit ramp” for whales while leaving small holders holding the bag. I encourage everyone to weigh these points carefully before supporting proposals that might inadvertently hurt the long‑term health of the ecosystem.
Thanks for reading and for fostering an open discussion.

