It shows the staking amount is increasing gradually. Although the increasing is not sharp, but:
The current staking ratio of the GMX token is approximately 76% (based on about 7.9M GMX staked / 10.35M circulating supply, data as of early November 2025). This ratio is at a very high level in the entire cryptocurrency industry (including PoS chains and DeFi protocols). The industry average staking ratio is typically around 40-60% (affected by circulating supply and incentive mechanisms), while top projects are mostly in the 60-80% range (ďźsol - 67%ďźAVAX - 58%ďźTRX - 48%ďź ETH - 28%ďź).
Considering GMXâs extremely high staking ratio within the industry, this indicates that the current token economics are successful. If we were to forcibly demand a substantial increase in stakingâfar exceeding the top levels across the entire industryâand attempt to artificially and massively boost the staking ratio, not only would the results be very limited, but it would also risk disrupting the current stable token economy, which already features a premium staking rate.
It is an obvious fact that the aforementioned tokens, which have staking ratios lower than GMXâs, all have market capitalizations far exceeding GMXâs. This indicates that GMXâs staking ratio is not the decisive factor behind its price declineâespecially given GMXâs already high staking level, where it is even less soâand it may not even serve as an effective driving factor.
the high staking ratio is also a double edged sword it means that the need to deliver a yield is on an extremely high base. If you were to further strip out the portion of the tokens that are owned by the treasury itself (POL, etc) that ratio is north of 80%
Hi Kalcyrpto, thank you for the chart as this makes it much easier to look at. I woul dlike to agree with this proposal, except the main fact that I looked into GMX was due to itâs higher APR, if it wasnât for this, I would never have looked at it. This poses a probllem to me for a few reasons.
GMX is a speculative asset meaning investors want a higher APR to compensate for risk, putting a cap of APR on a speculative asset hurts our image because we canât compensate holders through a higher APR, now I understand, capping it simply means paying out the rest at a later date, but how often does the APR fall below 10% anyways? Putting a hard APR cap on a speculative asset doesnât make much sense to me besides a less volatile line.
As for the weeks where we do hit spikes in liqudity, why are we punishing long time holders? If a random week has an apr of 50%, who cares? Let the stakers claim their rewards as they should because they are loyal stakers. I am in much more favor of a burning mechanism, perhaps we all agree that 1-2% of fees can go to burning instead or something.
The problem this introduces is: in any week with particularly high staking rewards, mercenary capital can come in and stake GMX while hedging the token price exposure with an equal-sized GMX short. This way they siphon the staking yield that should go to those loyal stakers.
I appreciate the robust feedback around the proposed cap on staking APR and the accumulation of Overhead as outlined in the âDynamic BBD Adjustment â Capping APR and Accumulating Overheadâ proposal. Many concerns are valid: that capping APR might reduce the speculative draw for stakers, that accumulated GMX may sit undistributed, and that large holders and low liquidity still pose structural risks.
With this in mind Iâd like to pose the following focused question: Given the current mechanics (buy-backs, treasury yield, staking rewards, locked supply, free float), what token price level do we believe marks the point where the risk-to-reward asymmetry strongly favors upside only?
To make this concrete, I invite input on the following key data points:
The total GMX held in treasury / Fee Handler (overhead) and its composition.
Current and projected protocol fee income (converted to GMX via BBD) and distribution schedule.
Staked GMX + esGMX vs circulating free float and how that ratio has trended.
Recent buy-back volumes and the velocity with which distributed GMX is sold vs held.
With those inputs we can model an âintrinsic floorâ for GMX (treasury + sustained fee flow spread over locked supply) and identify a price region where the draw-down risk is minimal and upside dominates. This becomes more relevant given the new proposalâs attempt to smooth rewards and build a buffer instead of continuous emissions.
My hope is the community can align on that price region (or at least the calculation method) so that when GMX approaches or falls below that level, accumulation mindset becomes more rational and coordinated. Iâm looking forward to seeing peopleâs models or views. Thank you for engaging.
If they have taken the risk of short positions being liquidated, then let them earn the high interest these days. As a small-cap stock, GMXâs price often experiences sharp spikes.
Smoothness is not necessary, and complex tokenomics might deter new users.
I would agree if there was enough liquidity to not cause great slippage. But I see your point and that can be seen as unfair and simple arbitrage. However, I do not now if capping it is the move because than it acts more like a perpetuity and I donât think that was the initial GMX vision? IDK, but regardless, I see the direction your going with this.
Given the current earnings, buybacks, staking levels, minimal inflation, and low float, I feel that anything under $10-12 represents significant value. Anything under $8 represents extreme value.
This will not work, because your model is based on MA of APR wich itself is derivative function inverse related to GMX token price. What growth or contraction states we are talking about? APR growth/contraction? If yes then we are in âperfectâ APR expansion state because it steadily rising for 2 years from ~5% to current ~25%. But token price collapsed 5x in same period and it not feels like expansion state at all. BTW I tried to put your proposed formulas into spreadsheet and canât get same reserve accumulation curve. Per my understanding your model canât create any meaningful reserve in long run even with supper low token price (but steadily rising very high APR).
Maybe we can think about measuring and tracking MA of BB amount (rather than the APR itself). However, the purpose of my proposal was not only to smooth out the rewards, but also to stabilize the GMX token price, as the downtrend lasting 2â3 years is causing significant damage to protocol reputation and marketing efforts. To support the GMX and reverse downtrend, we need to accumulate as many tokens as possible at this ridiculous low <$9 price. In short- we need to go bold otherwise there will be no impact.
I like your thinking what 5% APR is more healthier for mature protocol as GMX while majority of others are crying about such âlowâ my proposed 10% cap level. To satisfy all parties maybe we can introduce not strict âanchorâ but target APR band (letâs say 15%-5%) and accumulate/release distribution only outside the band.
My proposal seeks exactly the same- buy back and accumulate then price is super low and release only on uptrend.
I donât believe anyone will complain if distributions will ramp up on token rally. When it comes to low fees, letâs not be naive- nothing will save us if fees collapse. All this proposal is only valid if fees will stay at least at current level.
Implementing technical indicators/triggers will be too complicated/subjective and âpausing mechanismâ sounds very scary to many holders so I am afraid will be rejected straight away.
Simplest form of my proposal (APR cap or band) requires 0 time, 0 additional resources and 0 audits. Current BBD is manual process- once a week all BB GMX amount is manually withdrawn from FeeHandler contract and send to RewardsDistributor. Only difference will be to withdraw and/or send not all amount, but withing APR limits.
Again - more flexible (and mysterious) system is or if it can be anytime altered/changed by few arbitrary people (committee) more scary/unacceptable/unreliable proposal feels to all current stakers/holders who can dismiss it in voting. In my opinion proposal should be as simple as possible and tampering proof to have chance to pass voting.
Just proves my concern- we canât be overcomplicated here.
I like the idea and will literally try anything new. Can we also attribute a % of corporate fees not unused fees not for development and buyback and hold GMX as additional buy pressure. I used to buy GMX all the time, now i never buy it because of BB and D. I wonder if that has hurt buy pressure and volume in the market. We have to do something to sure the token up. Just feels like the market is punishing tokens that donât have any value or give max value back to the holder.
