GMX BBD&B Proposal (2026)

[Edifier]

Revised & Improved Version

Now that the GMX community has secured funding for GMX Labs for 2026 and 2027—supporting a planned capacity of 35–40 contributors (currently 30)—we can move on to securing GMX holders and addressing the persistent downward trend and declining interest in the GMX token.

Marketing and trading incentives are currently on the table through Rob’s proposal.
The expected effects include increased protocol revenue and additional buying pressure on the GMX token through incentive qualification mechanisms (minimum staking requirements and multiplier systems), as well as a $2,000,000 USDC GMX purchase on the open market.

However, this buying pressure alone will not solve the medium- to long-term issue: the sharp decline in the token’s value, driven by multiple factors such as increased competition and the explosive growth in new perpetual trading projects.

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[PROPOSAL]

Modify BBD to Buy Back, Distribute & Burn (BB D&B)

Proposed reward split:

• 50% used for buyback and burn

• 50% distributed in ETH or USDC to avoid continuous GMX selling pressure

Fewer tokens over time mean higher revenue per long-term staker and increased value for the GMX token.
This is simple mathematics.

The current model—where 100% of revenue is distributed in GMX—no longer makes sense, especially considering that the GMX token has dropped 67% over the past year.

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Historical Data & Impact Analysis

Since the implementation of BBD, 1,950,050 GMX have been distributed.

If a 50/50 Buy Back & Burn model had been applied:

• 50% of 1,950,050 GMX = 975,000 GMX burned

• 975,000 / total GMX supply (10,384,375) = 9.38% of total supply

• Total supply (10,384,375) – staked GMX (7,976,807) = 2,407,568 GMX on the open market

• 975,000 GMX burned vs. 2,407,568 GMX available = 40.49% of the open market supply removed

Now ask yourself:
What happens when 40.49% of the available GMX supply is removed from the open market while buying pressure increases?
The answer is obvious. Mathematics—without a doubt.

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“Is Burning Just Throwing Money Away?”

Absolutely not.

Reducing supply on the open market increases token value through buying pressure.
This creates a win–win structure:

• 50% immediate revenue distribution

• 50% burn, creating a supply shock on the open market

Additionally, fewer circulating tokens mean fewer tokens competing for staking rewards, which directly increases revenue per staker.

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“Other Protocols Tried This Without Results”

Each protocol has its own tokenomics and revenue structure.

• GNS generates less revenue and is close to stagnation, yet it has dropped only 38% over one year, compared to 67% for GMX

• Hyperliquid’s burn mechanism is working effectively

• BNB’s burn mechanism has proven successful over time

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Proposed Governance Timeline

Phase 1 & 2 – Discussion and Refinement (10 days)

Community input period:

• Feedback on the BB D&B 50/50 proposal

• Discussion on token revenue allocation and percentages

• Questions and clarifications regarding mechanics

• Alternative proposals and concerns

Phase 3 – Snapshot Vote (7 days)

Formal voting process:

• Official Snapshot vote on the finalized proposal

• Simple majority required for approval

• Clear voting options and implications

• Defined implementation timeline upon approval

Post-Vote

• If approved: Immediate implementation

• If rejected: Return to the discussion phase with community-driven adjustments

• Transparent communication regarding next steps

[Edifier]

Reserve for futur update

[Daniel]

support this proposal.

[Harrybo]

I dont support.

First of all, there is no selling pressure. People selling their rewards are selling tokens bought on the market. The result can only bé positive or net 0.

Second, what happens to the price when “all of that removed from the market” ? An even dipper dip when someone sell. Burning do not make the token more valuable in an absolut way : it also creates a bigger impact when sells occurs.

Experience show burning has actually no impact on a token price.

Id support a proposal about 50% BBD and 50% Gm : gmx-usdc accumulation tho. Making the token way more liquid, and removing token from the market by actually creating a better floor price.

[Nio]

totally agree!! and my vote is for this proposal

[Edifier]

@Harrybo

First of all, there is no selling pressure. People selling their rewards are selling tokens bought on the market. The result can only bé positive or net 0.

Second, what happens to the price when “all of that removed from the market” ? An even dipper dip when someone sell. Burning do not make the token more valuable in an absolut way : it also creates a bigger impact when sells occurs.

Experience show burning has actually no impact on a token price.

Id support a proposal about 50% BBD and 50% Gm : gmx-usdc accumulation tho. Making the token way more liquid, and removing token from the market by actually creating a better floor price.

Thanks for your feedback.

There is selling pressure, because distributing 100% — or even 50% — of rewards in GMX creates a predictable and recurring sell flow. Many stakers prefer ETH or USDC and therefore systematically sell their GMX rewards.

If someone sells, there will still be a dip under the current model or under a pure liquidity-based approach. Adding liquidity does not remove selling pressure — it only delays it.

The market has changed. We cannot rely on buyers coming back naturally. Since the ATH, many new PERP projects (JUP, LIGHTER, ASTER, HYPERLIQUID, etc.) have entered the market, and liquidity is now fragmented. Good technology alone is no longer enough — rarity matters.

If a whale wants to accumulate GMX while supply on the open market is limited, price discovery will happen upward until long-term holders are willing to sell.

Fewer circulating tokens mean fewer tokens competing for staking rewards, which directly increases revenue per staker.

Finally, buying pressure would not rely on burn alone, but on multiple combined mechanisms:
50% buyback & burn, the $2,000,000 GMX open-market purchase for trading incentives, minimum staking requirements, multiplier-based staking, and potentially new GMX utilities (such as fee rebates).

[michael_A]

I strongly disagree with this proposal. Buyback and Burn (BBB) will not have any positive impact on the token price for the following reasons:

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1. The Illusion of Deflation

The belief that burning tokens effectively boosts the price is a self-inflicted hallucination. Look at the facts: GNS is a classic example of the BBB model—in fact, it is entirely BBB. The result? No matter how low the market cap or how “cheap” the token became, the price still plummeted. This is objective evidence, not a fantasy. Furthermore, during the downward trend of the past few months, can you name a single token that avoided a massive drop because of BBB? If you can name even one, I will admit I am wrong. There are none—not a single one. This fact proves that BBB is meaningless.

2. Reduction of APR for Stakers

BBB reduces the APR for stakers, which would be extremely detrimental to GMX. To attract buyers, any financial product—whether it is a legitimate asset or a Ponzi scheme—utilizes methods that increase dividends or interest rates. Have you ever seen a financial product attract users by reducing dividends or rates? None exist, because lower returns only lead to fewer people buying and holding. GMX is no different. If staker returns decrease, not only will fewer people buy, but existing holders will sell, causing a price collapse. This is exactly why GNS, despite its full BBB model, continues to decline.

3. The Superiority of the BBD Model

The Buyback and Distribute (BBD) model is the optimal tokenomics structure. Its core value lies in keeping GMX’s fundamental worth anchored to real yield (based on actual user demand). By continuously expanding product types and optimizing user experience to grow the user base, GMX enhances its intrinsic value. As the GMX user base grows, BBD APR increases, which naturally attracts buyers and holders. This model aligns with the economic principle that “financial products attract investment by increasing dividends or interest rates.”

4. Avoiding the Path of Self-Destruction

If GMX abandons the BBD model, stops focusing on user growth, and fails to use real utility as the fundamental driver of token price, it will easily fall into a self-destructive trap. It risks “losing its value-building goals and pivoting toward short-term speculative scams.” Eventually, GMX would lose sight of its purpose, fall into a state of confusion regarding its future direction, or even collapse entirely as a failed project.

5. The Necessity of Stability

On the contrary, I suggest that GMX’s tokenomics and distribution methods should be solidified through an official announcement with a [commitment to no frequent changes]. This [deterministic stability] would significantly strengthen the conviction of both current and potential GMX users to buy and hold long-term.

It is deeply unsettling if a project’s economic model becomes shaky or subject to change whenever a community discussion arises. Tokenomics stability is, at its core, the stability of interest distribution among all parties—it is the foundation upon which a community aggregates. I believe this is critical. While discussion is healthy, everyone must know that no matter how heated the debate, the foundation will not be easily altered.

[Edifier]

Thank for your feedback.

1. The numbers tell a different story than your own interpretation.

GMX 1 year performance -67.10%

GNS 1 year performance -30.90%

Moreover, GNS generates significantly less revenue — $8.52M annualized compared to $52.36M annualized for GMX — while also having a much larger token supply (25,664,320 vs 10,384,971 for GMX).

This means that a burn mechanism naturally takes longer to become effective for GNS, yet we can already observe its impact on one-year performance.

As mentioned in my proposal, BNB and Hyperliquid have demonstrated that burn mechanisms can work effectively when supported by sufficient revenue and demand.

BNB 1 year performance +23%

HYPERLIQUID 1 year performance +38.50%

In conclusion, GMX’s strong revenue combined with a relatively low token supply can drive GMX toward a new all-time high much faster.

2. As I already said the current model—where 100% of revenue is distributed in GMX—no longer makes sense, especially considering that the GMX token has dropped 67% over the past year.

Focusing only on APR is a big mistake when the underlying token is collapsing.
You can earn 50% APR, but if the GMX token loses 67% of its value, the result is still negative.

Additionally, fewer circulating tokens mean fewer tokens competing for staking rewards, which directly increases revenue per staker.

3. I already showed in my previous post that BBD is not efficient. It does not attract buyers, and APR does not increase either. Moreover you forgot that buyers have now the choice with some many PERPS tokens compared to GMX ATH in 2023.

4. We don’t abandon the mechanism, we optimize as BBB&D (Buy Back Burn AND Distribute)

I’m sorry but the rest of your sentence makes no sense. You mix tokenomics and core product.

5. Products must evolve or die — it’s the nature of economics. Many projects are now in the graveyard, even though they once believed they had the best product, the best community, the best hype, and the best tokenomics.

[yellow]

I don’t think buy back and burn is justified.

Either do nothing for tokenomics, implement fee reductions for GMX holders (up to 40% with 1M GMX, 10% for 1k GMX, etc.)

Or implement the fee reductions + return to 100% paid in ETH. That would create a fantastic ETH yield, and people would buy GMX for that.

Burn will be out of fashion, and then people will write threads here to ask to remove it.

[Edifier]

Thank you for your feedback.

The proposal is Buy Back, Burn, and Distribute (not buy back and burn only).

I completely agree that we need to give more utility to the GMX token, such as fee reductions.

I also agree with you on being paid in ETH instead of GMX. My proposal is 50% buyback and burn, and 50% distributed in ETH.

The hybrid Buy Back, Burn, and Distribute mechanism satisfies both those who want ETH as revenue and those who have suffered from GMX’s price decline.

[stickypad]

if it is voted on, ill support it.

despite high fee gen relative to the mcap, it is true that gmx token price and mcap have been falling more precipitously than other perp dexes

[ShoeStar]

Hi Edifier, please look at my proposal where I suggest paying out fees in ETH as payouts in GMX is circular and crashes prices, I am open though to trading fee reductions on top of eth payouts for holding ETH, we have to get rid of this fee payout in GMX, we want to be paid out in a liquid asset.

[woofbark]

Personally I don’t think that we need to over think the problem, I just think we should return to the original GMX model with real yield. If the pay outs are in ETH it would instantly stop selling pressure and those that want to accumulate GMX are creating buy pressure this buy pressure and the chance to earn a real yield should increase interest in the protocol, imo

[michael_A]

your mention is not right.

If we see 5 months kline, another conclusion will be got. (1) GNS price went down from 2.3 to 0.86 = lost 62%; (2) GMX price went down from 15 to 6.1 = lost 59%. In the recent 5 months, GMX is better than GNS.

As to BNB and HYPE, we all know their marketcap are definitely not because of BBB. You know binance and hype have much more income than GMX. No doubt, GMX price will be at least ten or several tens or a hundred times than today if GMX’s income can get this level. In fact, the most important reason for binance and hype’s high market cap is they are all have the support of big capital. If no big capital and great income, their marketcap will decrease 90% no matter what BBB mode is adopted.

Increasing income and cooperating with big capitalist are the keys for GMX. Let team do things that take real value to GMX. Don’t waist team’s money, man-power, time on meaningless aspects. That is my consistent idea.

[Edifier]

It’s misleading to manipulate the numbers by choosing a timeline that only fits one narrative.
The BBD mechanism on GMX and the burn mechanism on GNS have both been implemented for over one year, so comparisons should be made over the same timeframe — not just over the last five months.

We all know that burn mechanisms are primarily effective over the mid- to long term. Comparing them over a short-term window is not meaningful.

Moreover, you mentioned that HYPE and Binance generate more revenue than GMX. That is correct but GMX generates roughly six times more revenue than GNS, which makes that comparison invalid.

Relying on hypothetical future capital inflows or waiting for a potential bull market is selling hope, not strategy.

Addressing GMX’s price decline is neither a waste of time nor money — it is a necessary step to strengthen the protocol’s long-term sustainability.

[new_hugo]

I will support this proposal and would prefer the payout in ETH

[p1no]

Excellent proposal, let’s start voting!

[Saulius]

Burning tokens is a nonsense. A better option would be to buy back and withhold part of the distribution for better times. The accumulated amount will simulate the same impact on the market as burning. However, this should be more appealing to stakers, as they will be compensated for the current austerity in the future. With burning, the rewards are gone forever.

[Edifier]

I understand your point of view and, of course, it could be an option — but not the preferred one.

Burning is permanent; it reduces supply and can support price appreciation over the long term through increased scarcity.

If the DAO accumulates GMX tokens, once those tokens are released to stimulate the market, the price could drop again. This risks creating a repeated pump-and-dump cycle rather than long-term value.

[siyuan]

Burning is a desirable solution, but given our current situation, publicly committing to a long-term stable tokenomics is the foundation for attracting investors to hold. Beyond that, focusing on technology is sufficient.