We both talked about the state of GMX, mentioning AI was a small point and it’s bizarre that you would become fixated on it. Sorry you can’t understand our posts. Since you are not educated enough to know ad hominem is a no-no, I’m not surprised more complex topics evade your limited analytical abilities. Maybe an AI can help explain what’s going on in this topic in a way that you would be capable of comprehending with your relatively small conceptual vocabulary and objectively impoverished educational achievements?
fees acquire gmx, value flows to gmx
but there isn’t any growth
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I say bring back MPs like you admit it locked whales in, my other thought was maybe if we stopped delegated voting that would stop a handful of people being able to sway the vote!?
My guy, I analyze the risk of seperate traunches in debt securities. To put it simply, I have lots of real world experience in analyzing multiple parts/ blocks of a system. GMX is compromised because a handfull of whales hold like 70% of the vote. There is nothing we can do. Every level of security has been compromised. Look at any crypto data broker and look at their security scores for GMX. What you will find is most, if not all show high concentrated and centralization within the GMX project. The market cap for GMX exists on paper, there are no buyers of this asset except for the buy back bot. Who are the only people here that have an interest in paying out fees in gmx rather than eth? The whales. Why do I say this? Becasue GMX is unsellable, so if fees paid out in ETH, it would treat GMX as more of a perputual dividend rather than an asset which is great for the holders of GMX. This is a problem for Whales of GMX because they do not want to hold something they cannot sell in large quantities. Anytime some body wants to do anything, YOU MUST question who is really benefitting from that decision?
Large GMX holders have shown multiple times that they are willing to back changes that do not directly benefit just them and could benefit the entire project and community.
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would it help if we stopped the ability to delegate your vote would that help at all?
There is a huge difference in paying out 40million of stolen funds back to the community vs voting on decisions that have an alternative motive than the stated objective of said change.
if gmx is unsellable, then…… why would whales want dividends to be in GMX?
I never said GMX was unsellable, I said that the lack of liquidity, would turn their paper wealth, into the fair market value of GMX, which would be no where near the current market price. This isn’t some evil consiparacy, my guy to boil it down, in order to sell, you need someone on the other side of the trade. Please tell me where you can point to anyone lining up to buy 500k gmx coins with little slippage? To your next point, I genuinely think that they thought it would be a good idea to pay out in dividends because they did not forsee the problem. That is fine, whatever, but now that we see the issue, and we stilll refuse to fix it, now THATS the problem.
3 months have passed since this proposal was posted. GMX price has collapsed another 30% from $9 to a ridiculous $6! Even the protocol metrics and fees have remained relatively stable. Supper good example that current BBD model is bad we can spot from last week. A monstrous amount of 57,55k GMX tokens (~3M yearly rate!) were bought back from market (because they are super cheap) and these buybacks supported the price significantly- GMX/ETH ratio gained +20% in a week. This showcases the buying power of buyback bot. However all of these GMX tokens will be distributed to stakers immediately (with 36.5% APR) and I’m sure that we will see the GMX price collapse again after just another weak fees week. This negative feedback loop never stops.
So I’m reviewing/summarizing my proposal in next post and will send it to snapshot voting in a few days.
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Snapshot Proposal — Dynamic BBD Adjustment (APR Band + Buffer)
Overview
This proposal refines GMX’s Buy-Back & Distribute (BBD) mechanism by introducing a dynamic APR band (5%–15%). The goal is to make staking rewards more adaptive, counter-cyclical, and sustainable, while reducing short-term volatility and mercenary capital behavior.
Proposed Mechanics
1. APR Band: 5%–15%
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Below 5% APR
- Rewards are supplemented by releasing previously accumulated GMX from a buffer.
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Within 5%–15% APR
- All rewards flow normally to GMX stakers.
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Above 15% APR
- Excess rewards are cut and accumulated into a buffer instead of being distributed.
This creates a soft stabilization range, rather than a hard cap.
2. Accumulation Buffer (“Overhead”)
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Excess GMX (from rewards above 15% APR) is accumulated in a protocol-controlled buffer.
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The buffer is used only to support rewards when APR falls below 5%.
Maximum buffer size:
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1.325M GMX, equal to 10% of total GMX supply.
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Once the buffer cap is reached, all rewards flow directly to stakers, even if APR exceeds 15%.
This ensures the mechanism cannot indefinitely withhold rewards.
3. No Permanent Lock-In
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This proposal is explicitly a tokenomics experiment, not a permanent change.
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Minimum evaluation period: 1 year.
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After 1 year, governance will hold a follow-up vote to:
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Adjust APR band parameters,
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Change buffer size or logic, or
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Abandon the mechanism entirely if results are unsatisfactory.
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Why This Makes Sense
Smoother staking experience
Reduces sharp APR spikes and drops, improving predictability for long-term stakers.
Counter-cyclical rewards
Excess rewards are saved during high-fee periods and deployed when conditions weaken.
Reduced mercenary behavior
APR spikes above 15% no longer disproportionately attract short-term capital.
Hard safety limits
The 1.325M GMX cap guarantees rewards are never permanently withheld.
Governance-first approach
A built-in review after 1 year ensures the DAO retains full control.
Key Takeaway
Instead of distributing all protocol revenues immediately, GMX adopts a reward smoothing system:
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Accumulate when rewards are excessive,
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Support stakers when rewards are weak,
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Cap accumulation to protect stakers,
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Re-evaluate after real-world data.
This proposal aims to balance long-term value alignment, token price stability, and fair reward distribution.
P.S.
Why a 5%–15% APR Band Is a Solid Design Choice
1. Anchored Above Risk-Free, Below Reflexive Failure
A 5%–15% APR range deliberately sits:
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Above low-risk baseline yields (e.g. ETH staking at ~3%), and
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Well below historically unstable reward levels that rely on constant growth or emissions.
This positioning makes GMX staking:
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Clearly attractive relative to blue-chip alternatives,
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But not dependent on unsustainable assumptions.
The band avoids the trap of promising fixed, high yields that implicitly require new participants or ever-increasing fees to remain viable.
2. Lower Bound (5%): Meaningful Yield, Even in Weak Conditions
A 5% floor ensures GMX staking remains:
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Economically meaningful during low-volume or bearish periods,
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Competitive with conservative on-chain yield options.
Below this level, many long-term holders disengage or seek alternatives, weakening staking participation and governance alignment.
The buffer-supported release mechanism helps maintain this floor without relying on emissions.
3. Upper Bound (15%): Preventing Reflexive APR Spirals
APR levels above ~15% tend to:
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Attract short-term capital chasing yield,
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Encourage delta-neutral or hedged strategies,
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Increase sell pressure on distributed rewards.
History shows that persistent double-digit yields well above this range often signal reflexive tokenomics rather than sustainable revenue.
A well-known example is Terra / LUNA, which offered ~20% “stable” yield. That model required continuous inflows and collapsed once growth slowed — despite appearing attractive on paper.
By cutting and buffering rewards above 15%, GMX avoids:
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Reflexive feedback loops,
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Yield-driven speculation,
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And false signals about protocol profitability.
4. A Band, Not a Target
Crucially, 5%–15% is not a promise — it’s a control range.
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If real protocol revenues justify 15%+, excess is saved, not paid immediately.
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If revenues weaken, previously earned value supports stakers.
This makes APR:
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Adaptive, not fixed,
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Revenue-anchored, not emission-driven,
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And resilient across market cycles.
5. Long-Term Sustainability > Short-Term Optics
Protocols that aim to “look attractive” via high, stable APRs often sacrifice long-term survivability.
The 5%–15% band:
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Signals financial discipline,
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Aligns rewards with actual protocol performance,
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And prioritizes longevity over marketing yield.
Combined with:
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A hard buffer cap,
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A 1-year evaluation period,
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And explicit governance oversight,
…the system remains both competitive and conservative.
Bottom Line
The 5%–15% APR band is:
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Better than most blue-chip alternatives,
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Low enough to be sustainable,
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High enough to reward conviction,
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And explicitly designed to avoid known tokenomics failure modes.
It is a measured, experience-driven range — informed by past collapses, not theoretical models.
Dynamic banding is btr than prev and 15% is fair imo, will support
Not a fan of this proposal, it’s too complicated and I have serious doubts about its effectiveness.
I disagree.
Why implement such a complicated adjustment that requires heavy work from the team when we can choose a better alternative?
Hi all, I will vote against. I even think we should stop the epochs and distribute immediately to take out the gaming element of staking, people can now stake when fees are high and sell afterwards when the epoch is done. This proposal is too complex in my view.
Removing the epochs and distribute immediately would in my view create an incentive to keep GMX staked and is more fair to people that staked in the period when the volume happened and not the week after.
This proposal has been initiated for a vote on Snapshot:
Responses to Likely Objections
“This reduces upside for stakers in strong markets.”
Objection:
If the protocol is performing extremely well, why cap rewards? Stakers should fully benefit from high-fee environments.
Response Strategy:
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The mechanism does not remove rewards, it delays a portion during extreme spikes.
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Excess is stored and later redistributed during weaker periods.
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Once the buffer cap (1.325M GMX) is reached, all rewards flow through normally.
Core rebuttal line:
The proposal smooths rewards, it does not confiscate them. Stakers still receive full value over time, just with reduced volatility.
“This is unnecessary complexity.”
Objection:
The current BB&D works. Why add mechanisms?
Response Strategy:
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Most weeks historically fall inside the 5–15% band → no change in normal conditions.
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It’s a parameter-based adjustment, not a redesign.
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No structural contract overhaul required.
Core rebuttal line:
In most normal weeks, nothing changes. This mechanism only activates in extremes.
“APR should be market-driven, not engineered.”
Objection:
Governance shouldn’t manage yields — the market should.
Response Strategy:
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BB&D is already engineered.
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This proposal doesn’t fix APR — it defines a stabilization corridor.
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It makes yield less reflexive, not more manipulated.
Core rebuttal line:
This doesn’t set yield — it reduces reflexive volatility caused by extreme revenue spikes.
“15% is arbitrary.”
Objection:
Why 15%? Why not 12% or 18%?
Response Strategy:
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It sits meaningfully above blue-chip baseline (~3% ETH staking).
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It stays well below historically unstable fixed high-yield models (~20%).
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The 1-year review explicitly allows adjustment.
Core rebuttal line:
15% is a conservative upper bound — and governance can adjust it after real-world data.
“New stakers benefit from old buffer — that’s unfair.”
Objection:
Why should someone staking today benefit from rewards accumulated before they joined?
Response Strategy:
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That’s how staking pools function.
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It improves entry attractiveness and liquidity depth.
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Long-term stakers are compensated via continuous participation — leaving means forfeiting exposure to future buffer releases.
Core rebuttal line:
The shared buffer strengthens the entire staking pool, increasing stickiness and entry attractiveness simultaneously.
“This is yield suppression during bull markets.”
Objection:
We should maximize visible yield when momentum is strong.
Response Strategy:
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High visible yield often attracts mercenary capital.
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That capital exits quickly, creating sell pressure.
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Sustainable yield > flashy yield.
Core rebuttal line:
The goal is durable value accrual, not short-term APR optics.
“Marketing already passed — let’s see results first.”
Objection:
We just voted for marketing. Don’t stack changes.
Response Strategy:
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This complements marketing.
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Marketing increases activity; this ensures increased fees translate to structured buy pressure.
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It strengthens value capture mechanics.
Core rebuttal line:
Marketing increases volume; this ensures that increased fees convert into structured long-term buy pressure.
“What if the buffer grows too large and distorts price?”
Objection:
Accumulated GMX could become a supply overhang.
Response Strategy:
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Hard cap: 1.325M GMX (10% supply).
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After cap → full flow-through resumes.
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It cannot grow indefinitely.
Core rebuttal line:
The buffer is capped and self-limiting. It cannot expand beyond predefined governance boundaries.
1 Like
Good summary, I agree with those 8 reasonings and would recommend everyone consider them well.
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I support this one. As a long term oriented gmx holder I want to see it in action. Atleast for 5-6 months. 1 year maybe too much.
And I CLEARLY see the reasons why short term gamers dont like this proposal, little mfrs 