GMX Labs Leadership Update

Proposals
1

Summary

This proposal outlines GMX Labs’ organizational evolution plan and lays the foundation for an upcoming DAO proposal. GMX Labs has supported the development and operation of the GMX protocol over the years. During this period, the protocol has grown significantly, and the contributor team has evolved from a small, highly autonomous group into a larger, multi-functional organization.

While the early-stage, flat, founder-driven structure worked well initially, it has become increasingly challenging to scale as the team expanded and the competitive landscape of perpetual DEXs matured. To continue supporting the protocol effectively, GMX Labs must evolve to a clearer, more accountable, and better-aligned organizational model.

Motivation

The GMX Labs team has identified several challenges that have emerged as the protocol and contributor organization matured, these include:

Operational Scaling

  • The Labs team has grown organically, leading to overlapping responsibilities and a lack of clarity in governance and project responsibility.
  • The absence of defined functional leadership has slowed execution across core areas.

Execution & Decision-Making

  • Key decisions often required broad group involvement, resulting in delays.
  • No single leader or structure existed to resolve cross-functional blockers or set unified priorities.

Competitive Pressure

  • Perpetual DEX competitors have matured operationally and strategically.
  • GMX Labs requires a stronger internal structure to maintain and grow GMX’s market position.

Incentive Alignment

  • Current contributor incentives are not tightly linked to protocol-level outcomes such as fees, adoption, volume, and token performance.

Leadership Evolution

  • Several founding contributors who have carried major responsibilities since launch expressed a desire to step back from daily operational leadership and return to technical or advisory-focused roles.

These challenges are typical for maturing contributor organizations and represent an opportunity for GMX Labs to evolve.

Rationale

To address the structural and operational challenges outlined above, it is proposed that GMX Labs moves toward a more defined ‘traditional’ leadership model.

One central element of this shift is the proposed creation of a leadership role, akin to and for ease of reference in this proposal, termed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for GMX Labs. This position will be filled through a broad, open search process.

The goal is to select the most capable leader to guide GMX Labs into its next phase of growth and operational maturity, while improving execution speed, accountability, and alignment with protocol outcomes.

Specifications

1. Leadership Evolution and CEO Role

GMX Labs will evolve toward a defined leadership structure, centered around a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) role and other CXOs/Department heads.

The CEO will be selected through a comprehensive, open search process, to identify the most capable leader to guide GMX Labs into its next phase of growth and operational maturity.

CEO Responsibilities

The incoming CEO will be responsible for:

  • Setting strategic direction for GMX Labs and outlining the organization’s medium- and long-term priorities
  • Formalizing the leadership team, defining functional areas, and establishing clear organizational structures and reporting lines
  • Improving operational efficiency and cross-team clarity, ensuring decisions can be made promptly and executed effectively
  • Strengthening partnerships, integrations, and competitive positioning within the DeFi ecosystem and institutional landscape
  • Driving accountability across all functions, resolving blockers, and ensuring alignment toward shared objectives
  • Aligning contributor incentives with protocol performance, creating a results-driven and sustainably motivated organization
  • Serving as a primary public-facing representative of GMX Labs, engaging with the GMX community, partners, and wider industry participants

2. Interim Leadership Committee

To guide GMX Labs through this evolution as permanent leadership is established, an Interim Leadership Committee has been created.

Members: X, Coin, B, Kal

Mandate of the Interim Committee

  • Continuing to implement the current roadmap, including making all critical decisions required to advance product, engineering, growth, and operational work
  • Maintaining operational stability during the evolution period
  • Leading the CEO search and evaluation process, including identifying candidates, coordinating interviews, and preparing recommendations
  • Defining the proposed organizational structure that the new CEO will formalize and lead
  • Coordinating transparent communication with the DAO and broader community throughout the evolution
  • Generally ensuring the well-being of the GMX Ecosystem during the evolution phase

3. Evolution Timeline

Apr 2026 — CEO Hiring and Onboarding

  • Conduct broad candidate search across DeFi, CeFi, TradFi, and technology sectors
  • Engage candidates using a DAO-approved hiring mandate
  • Complete hiring and onboarding by end of Apr 2026

June 2026 — Organizational Restructuring

Once the CEO is onboarded:

  • Finalize and implement a clear updated organizational structure for GMX Labs
  • Establish functional leadership roles and performance metrics
  • Align incentive frameworks with protocol / DAO outcomes
  • Provide a public update to the DAO on the completed restructuring
  • Submit a revised, performance-aligned funding proposal (Contributor Token Allocation) for GMX Labs

4. Compensation Package

The CEO compensation framework is designed to align leadership incentives directly with GMX protocol performance and GMX tokenholder outcomes, while maintaining strong DAO oversight and predictable exposure.

This section presents a framework and approval ranges, not a finalized employment agreement. The DAO is being asked to approve the structure, philosophy, and bounds of the compensation approach so that GMX Labs can credibly pursue a competitive CEO hire.

Illustrative examples are provided in Annex A later in this document, solely to demonstrate how incentives scale across different outcomes and to help estimate budget exposure. The final structure, allocation, and key mechanics would be ratified with the DAO during this process.

A. Base Compensation

  • $150,000 – $200,000 USD per year
  • Paid in stablecoins
  • Intended to support full-time leadership focus
  • Kept intentionally modest relative to performance-based compensation

B. Performance-Based Token Incentives (Protocol Metrics)

The primary incentive component is GMX token-denominated and earned only through protocol performance improvements.

  • Base performance pool: up to 40,000 GMX per year
  • Exceptional performance pool: up to 10,000 GMX (one-time)

Token incentives are earned based on protocol fee growth relative to the current baseline of approximately $60M annual protocol fees.

Illustrative Performance Targets

Performance Tier Annual Fees Growth vs Baseline Incentive Outcome
Baseline (Today) ~$60M — No token incentives
Strong Execution ~$90M +50% Partial base pool
Step-Change Growth ~$120M +100% Full base pool (40K GMX)
Exceptional Outcome ~$135M +125% Full base + exceptional pool (50K GMX total)

C. Token Performance Adjustment (Tokenholder Alignment)

Earned GMX incentives are adjusted based on GMX token performance, measured using a 30-day moving average (MA).

GMX 30D MA Multiplier
< $15 0.5×
$15 – $25 0.75×
$25 – $40 1.0×
$40 – $70 1.25×
≥ $70 1.5×

Protocol performance determines how many GMX are earned; token performance adjusts how much of that earned amount is realized.

D. Performance Incentives Vesting

  • 25% unlocks immediately upon performance targets being met
  • Remaining 75% vests linearly over 24 months (monthly)
  • Vesting stops if the CEO departs early
  • Unvested tokens are forfeited
  • DAO retains the right to revoke unvested tokens in cases of misconduct or gross negligence

E. Time-vested Token Component (Retention and Alignment)

In addition to performance-based incentives, a limited time-vested GMX component may be included to support retention and long-term alignment.

  • Up to 10,000 GMX per year
  • Vesting monthly over 24 months
  • Forfeited upon early departure
  • Counts toward the total annual GMX compensation cap

This component is intentionally modest and does not replace performance-based incentives.

F. Total Compensation Cap

Total CEO token-based compensation shall not exceed 75,000 GMX in any calendar year, inclusive of base incentives, exceptional incentives, token-performance multipliers, and any time-vested component.

This cap represents a best-case scenario achievable only under strong protocol growth and sustained token performance.

G. Key Takeaways for the DAO

  • No meaningful incentives are earned without material protocol growth
  • Token underperformance meaningfully reduces CEO compensation
  • Maximum compensation is capped and only achievable under exceptional outcomes
  • Token dilution occurs only alongside substantial value creation for the protocol and GMX stakers

H. Note on Scope and Next Steps

This compensation framework is presented as a tentative structure to enable the DAO to evaluate the budget range and incentive philosophy required to pursue a strong, competitive CEO hire and weigh in on the strategic direction being taken

The intent at this stage is to seek DAO pre-approval for the overall structure and ranges, allowing GMX Labs to proceed with a credible and ambitious hiring process supported by clear DAO backing. Subsequent proposals will address the timing and nature of approvals and the level of decision delegation the DAO extends to negotiate and finalize such arrangements.

Final numbers, performance targets, and detailed mechanics will be approved by the DAO once a CEO is selected. After the CEO is appointed, the new leadership team will submit a follow-up governance proposal to formalize any compensation package, along with broader updates to contributor compensation.

As part of this evolution, GMX Labs also anticipates proposing changes to the broader Contributor Token Allocation framework. The current contributor allocation (e.g., 250,000 GMX for 2026–2027) is largely fixed and not explicitly tied to protocol performance.

Under the proposed direction, a portion of future contributor allocations for leadership and select senior contributors would be more strongly performance-based, milestone-driven, and subject to vesting. This may result in a larger total token allocation than current levels, with any increase strictly conditional on achieving meaningful protocol outcomes.

This update is intended to provide transparency into the direction of travel, while recognizing that the full restructuring of contributor incentives will be addressed through separate, dedicated DAO proposals.

For reference, the approved funding proposal can be found here:
https://snapshot.org/#/s:gmx.eth/proposal/0x8495d384a1c39623d22fb239711f73ded6ba108ee7e91f0eb36d1375ca581c25

That proposal focused on operational continuity and alluded to but did not yet reflect the organizational and incentive restructuring outlined in this update.

5. Annex A: Illustrative Compensation Scenarios (Non-Binding)

The following scenarios are provided for illustration only and do not represent guaranteed or DAO-approved compensation amounts.

Scenario 1: Strong Execution, Moderate Token Recovery

  • Annual protocol fees: ~$90M (+50% vs baseline)
  • Protocol incentive earned: ~20,000 GMX (partial base pool)
  • GMX 30D MA price: ~$30
  • Token multiplier: 1.0×

Final GMX earned: 20,000 GMX
Approx. dollar value: ~$600,000

Vesting:

  • 5,000 GMX unlocked immediately
  • 15,000 GMX vest linearly over 24 months

Scenario 2: Exceptional Outcome with Full Alignment

  • Annual protocol fees: ~$135M (+125% vs baseline)
  • Protocol incentive earned: 50,000 GMX (full base + exceptional pool)
  • GMX 30D MA price: ~$70
  • Token multiplier: 1.5×

Final GMX earned: 75,000 GMX (annual cap)
Approx. dollar value: ~$5.25M

Vesting:

  • 18,750 GMX unlocked immediately
  • 56,250 GMX vest linearly over 24 months

Scenario 3: Protocol Growth with Weak Token Performance

  • Annual protocol fees: ~$120M (+100% vs baseline)
  • Protocol incentive earned: 40,000 GMX
  • GMX 30D MA price: ~$14
  • Token multiplier: 0.5×

Final GMX earned: 20,000 GMX
Approx. dollar value: ~$280,000

Vesting:

  • 5,000 GMX unlocked immediately
  • 15,000 GMX vest linearly over 24 months

6. Governance Process Timeline

  • Phase 1: Discussion (2 weeks)

  • Phase 2: Refinement (1 week)

  • Phase 3: Snapshot Vote (1 week)

  • Implementation upon approval

Conclusion

This proposal outlines an evolution toward a more mature, accountable, and execution-focused organizational structure for GMX Labs.

By introducing clear leadership, aligning incentives with protocol performance, and maintaining transparency with the DAO, this evolution aims to strengthen GMX’s long-term competitiveness and sustainability.

The Interim Leadership Committee welcomes feedback from contributors and the broader community as this plan is refined ahead of a DAO vote.

3 Likes
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Reserved for future comments and updates

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GMX has long been a very organically grown, community-sourced, and group-driven enterprise. I expect it will be good to balance this powerful egalitarian foundation with a clearer leadership structure.

Crypto has changed immensely, and we need to keep evolving alongside.

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4

Overall would vote yes, i understand how negative in terms of people and processes been against labs due to price action and why the decision to get someone else to helm it and the reasons given.

But if any labs member would want to take helm, i would rather it be them than someone that hasnt been with the protocol, as labs committee have been with us all these time.

And honestly i see labs as a seperate entity helping the dao execute decisions so if labs wants to hire a ceo, dont see the need for a dao vote, labs should be able to have autonomy.

Thanks to all current and future contributors of GMX for the effort poured into the protocol despite all the recent negativity.

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5

Let me share my own business experience and propose these for the possibility of gmx 10x of current fees, and hence once you taken care of profit, the pricing would be taken care of.

  1. choose a CEO that is public facing

  2. dismantle the DAO. We are no longer #1. In fact, in terms of mindshare, we not even in top 10.

We need fast and decisive. Imagine Coca-Cola sales dipped terribly in Halloween and they have to ask DAO to vote on big market decisions and ta-da, missed thanksgiving, missed Christmas, missed Chinese new year spikes.

While Pepsi move fast and furious and tied up deals with cafes, pizzas, movie, and also branching out into titbits Lay potato chips, buying over big bottling plants while Coca-Cola explaining to their shareholders that the polar bear gimmick is no longer working and we need to expand into non-sugar beverage

a DAO is not feasible for a struggling start up

Let’s have a bold ceo who moves fast and furious and dismantle the Dao to let him work

Apple was collapsing until they brought in Steve Jobs.

Then Tim Cook found new opportunities and brought Apple even higher

GmX is the Apple of defi

1 Like
6

I believe that Labs should have autonomy to make business decision, and the gmx token is more like a shareholder they shouldnt participate in day to day business operations but just business alignment on token price, most voters would agree and vote for it.

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7

Agree with you. We need an exposure through professional approach.

1 Like
8

We truly need strong leadership, someone who understands both technology and the market, to lead GMX to a breakthrough and become a top-tier perpetual futures DEX.

Furthermore, GMX needs a brand revamp. People will compare GMX with Hyper and Lighter, so we need to highlight GMX’s advantages, conduct repeated marketing campaigns, consolidate our trading volume base, and proceed steadily. With this approach, we will surely achieve significant growth.

9

Just sharing my thoughts on the leadership discussion.

From where I stand, GMX already has a clear leader in practice, which is X. Whether we frame the structure as a DAO, a board, a distributor setup, or a group of mods doesn’t change the core issue. At GMX’s current size and stage, having one clear leader matters far more than the exact organizational labels. For me, that leader is X.

There are plenty of real-world examples where boards or externally hired professional managers end up doing more harm than good, even to businesses that were already successful. That risk feels especially relevant for GMX right now, where direction, culture, and credibility are closely tied to the original leadership. Unless X personally wants to step back, I don’t think we should be seriously discussing a leadership change at this point.

If the concern is about clarity or efficiency, a simpler option could be a DAO vote that explicitly authorizes the current team, under X’s leadership, to make decisions on staffing, funding, and tokenomics within a clearly defined scope and time frame, say the next two years. That kind of setup would be much easier to reason about and operate.

I strongly feel that GMX needs X’s leadership and influence, not another person with a CEO title. If X needs formal authorization from the DAO to make decisions within certain limits, I expect the DAO would be very supportive. One thing I do notice is that X rarely speaks publicly and seems careful about not using his influence too openly. I personally wish he would be a bit more proactive, especially during moments like this.

It’s also possible that X is feeling burned out, which is completely understandable. Even in that scenario, I think any new executive role should look more like a COO role, focused on execution, operating day to day, and reporting to X. That would strengthen operations without creating confusion around who sets direction.

Overall, I think leadership continuity is one of GMX’s biggest strengths right now, and any changes we make should aim to support that, not dilute it.

4 Likes
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Yes, having mixed feelings about this too.

I asked my favorite SOTA LLM to confirm the intuition (with a non-biased detailed prompt but framed as a traditional startup), and the output is:

  • Clear success: ~25 to 35 percent
  • Mixed or partial success: ~30 to 40 percent
  • Failure: ~30 to 40 percent

The top remark is: Founder motivation matters more than CEO quality.

Edit: Maybe the best would be to find top advisors for X.

11

Should we start looking for a CEO to lead us? Be it the founder (X) or if X prefers, someone to lead the group.

as Snipermonkey shared, do you want Maverick (Top Gun) to fly a fighter jet or do you want him to run the airbase?

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Outreach to potential candidates has begun, and anyone who believes they could also be an excellent candidate is encouraged to reach out!

1 Like
13

Thanks to the Interim Leadership Committee for putting this together. As a listing committee member and someone who’s been closely involved with the GMX ecosystem (for years at this point), it’s encouraging to see the team proactively addressing the structural challenges. Though I do wish it was earlier.

I want to share some honest thoughts, because I think this proposal is directionally right but may not go far enough.

The DAO Needs a Decisive Leader, Not a Consensus Manager

Let’s be real honest one of the biggest threats to any DAO isn’t competition, it’s decision paralysis. The proposal acknowledges this (“key decisions often required broad group involvement, resulting in delays”), but the solution needs to match the severity of the problem.

If we’re hiring a CEO, that person needs genuine authority to move fast. Not “facilitate alignment across stakeholders” authority rather real, operational command. The best-performing protocols in DeFi right now aren’t the most decentralized ones. They’re the ones where a strong leader can make a call on Monday and ship it by Friday (some of them even work in an office together 5 days a week). GMX’s competitors aren’t waiting for governance votes to make product decisions.

The CEO should have a clear mandate from the DAO with defined boundaries, and within those boundaries, the autonomy to execute without friction. Guardrails, not gridlock. I’d like to understand how the Interim Committee envisions the balance of power between the CEO and ongoing DAO governance because if every strategic move still requires a proposal cycle, we haven’t actually solved the problem this proposal identifies.

Co-location vs. Distributed — Has This Been Discussed?

One question I haven’t seen addressed: is there a vision for whether the CEO should bring contributors into a shared physical space, or is the assumption that GMX Labs remains fully remote?

This matters more than people think. Speed of execution, culture-building, and cross-functional alignment are dramatically easier when people are in the same room. Some of the most successful teams in crypto and in tech broadly made the deliberate choice to co-locate during high-growth phases, even if they started remote (see why every major tech company is now requiring employees back in the office).

I’m not saying GMX Labs needs a headquarters tomorrow, but the incoming CEO should have the latitude to make that call. If the goal is truly to compete at the highest level, the operating model needs to be on the table.

On the CEO Profile

The proposal mentions a broad search across DeFi, CeFi, TradFi, and technology. I’m curious how the committee is weighing these backgrounds:

  • How much weight is placed on candidates who already understand GMX’s ecosystem and community dynamics vs. those coming in on operational credentials alone?

  • Is there a preference for someone who has built and scaled organizations as a founder/operator, or candidates with experience managing within larger, established structures?

As a cofounder, I’ve found the hardest part of leading a high-growth organization isn’t strategy but translating strategy into execution across distributed teams while keeping alignment tight. That challenge is amplified in a DAO context where authority has to be earned, not assumed.

On Incentive Alignment

The performance-based compensation structure is solid. A couple of questions worth discussing:

  • How will the baseline (~$60M annual fees) be adjusted over time? The structure should distinguish between execution-driven growth and macro tailwinds — otherwise we’re rewarding a bull market, not leadership.

  • On the token multiplier has the committee considered a floor mechanism? A 0.5x multiplier during a prolonged bear market could repel strong candidates at the exact moment strong leadership matters most.

On Broader Contributor Incentives

The note about potentially increasing total contributor allocations beyond 250K GMX deserves its own dedicated discussion. I’d encourage the committee to publish a framework for how any increase maps to measurable outcomes alongside the CEO hire, not after. The community should have full visibility before, not after, the check is written.

GMX has always punched above its weight. Getting the leadership structure right and giving that leader real teeth is what keeps that going. Happy to contribute to this process however I can.

1 Like
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Hyperliquid is an 11-man team, and look at what they’ve accomplished in such a short time.

GMX is constantly adding more and more “contributors” while every key metric gets worse and worse. Practically 40 people, and what do they have to show for it in terms of GMX health?

I’m happy that Saurabh is acknowledging the obvious problem, but the community isn’t the kind that reflects and pivots. What would a “CEO” even do when all of the big decisions have to go through the dao, and therefore have to go through Q’s veto power that he has thanks to his voting share.

Sorry but there isn’t a solution to this. For instance, just because the Telegram channel is completely dead, do you really think THIS community is going to approve reducing the # of mods? That’s not how the DAO operates.

This is a pointless topic, OP.

1 Like
15

The ‘Hyperliquid 11-person team’ story is wonderful mythology. One, it’s from last year, and Hyperliquid has grown significantly; two, the actual claim at the time was that they had 11 core contributors. How many non-core contributors do you think they have..?

I’m all for critically evaluating GMX’s operational structure, leadership, and so on. But let’s do it in a productive and realistic manner.

As GMX builds out its finance ecosystem in a decentralized way, development progress takes time. Generally, more time than if you opt for more centralized trading solutions. The community wanted faster updates. GMX invested in additional development contributors. Shipping is now much faster.

As the community thinned out and became less vocal, organic distribution became limited. People asked for scaling up Marketing. GMX hired additional marketing contributors, who are actively working on this.

And meanwhile, in terms of expenditure, GMX is still a very lean and effective organization.

Let’s keep that context in mind.

2 Likes