The Great Recovery: Restore, Reboot, & Accelerate GMX
- RESTORE: multiplier point incentives and eth dividends
- REBOOT: recognize the system has crashed into a downward spiral failure mode and mitigate accumulated/ongoing damage with a hard reset
- ACCELERATE: use our healthy treasury to speed up the short-term recovery process and add long-term game-changing features
Preamble:
Everyone, especially whales, who voted for the greedy short-sighted embarrassing failures which removed MultiplierPoints, changed ETH dividends to GMX, and enabled the retarded Buy Back & Dump fiasco:
Please, eat crow instead of talking here. We tried things your way and thus missed out on the greatest Bitcoin and DeFi Perp bull market in history. Kindly stay out of our
attempts to fix the damage you have caused. Thanks in advance.
The removal/vesting/dumping of MPs (supposedly for the sake of âMuh nEw bUYerSâ) was an obnoxiously obvious way for sell-out OGs to move on to greener pastures like Hyperliquid,
while gaslighting us about the theoretical advantages of changing bear-tested and demonstrably successful project tokenomics. Shame on everyone who got jealous of the short-lived little pump GNS enjoyed after switching to the pathetic shopworn gimmick of token buy-backs, and thus insisted we likewise shoot ourselves in the foot by copying them in regrettable a fit of insecurity.
Spare us the toxic positivity; do not insult our intelligence (this post contains 0.00% LLM slop) by whining about overdue acknowledgement that GMXâs current trajectory is
overwhelmingly negative, from token price to TVL to the price of Blueberry NFTs!
I. The path to GMX recovery:
A. Restore the original MP ponzinomics with default ETH distributions.
Add a new option to receive dividends in any GLV or GM pool or pure Bitcoin. Accept the fact our crappy experiment in GMX buy-back-and-dumps replacing MPs and ETH dividends is a total failure.
B. No changes to maximum emission.
We have a $35 million Treasury for exactly this kind of do-or-die, now-or-never situation. Expanding token supply would send the worst possible message by confirming the marketâs current perception that GMX is easily manipulated, almost worthless trash.
Reassuring current and potential stakeholders that GMXâs total supply is set in stone is a small, necessary signal within a larger reorganization context sufficient to regain competitive status conducive to positive future growth expectations.
C. Accelerate short-term recovery with a 90 day hard reboot of shock therapy:
- Double MP rewards.
Use 50% of the Treasuryâs GMX tokens to double incentives for MP accumulation/staking by converting Treasury GMX to MPs and matching usersâ earned MPs 1:1.
Thatâs about $3 million going directly to active users/stakers who desire long-term alignment with a rebooted GMX project. Bonus MPs should be kept available until they run out, whether it takes more or less than 90 days. - Fee Holiday.
During the 90 day reboot, cut fees to the exact ChaosLab-specified minimum required to prevent wash trading, economic attacks, etc.
This (extremely controversial) brief period of austerity greatly reduces staking rewards, but GMX stakers/voters deserve temporary pain punishing, via slashed dividends, previous bad governance decisions. They can accept 1:1 boosted MPs as a substitute, or GTFO.
The fee holiday is classic shock therapy; it divides holders into those willing to accept short term pain for long term gain, and expunges rent-collecting bad actors who have essentially been farming loyal holders by vesting and dumping MPs into diminishing exit liquidity.
For all the blather about âbuying successâ via cheesy marketing, competitions, and other cringe try-hard inorganic BS, the ultimate advertisement is simply a better product. For traders, that means astonishingly low fees, deep liquidity, out-of-band incentives, and reliable security.
We obviously need to make sacrifices to earn back customers and stakeholders, most of whom have understandably abandoned GMX for other projects. We must persuade them to return and stay by offering a better environment for traders, holders, and everyone else. - Maintain current Liquidity Provider incentives to avoid loss of TVL.
For 90 days, replace reduced GLV/GM staking rewards using non-GMX Treasury funds so LPsâ fees will not be changed by the bare-minimum Fee Holiday.
Treasury has $30 million in non-GMX tokens; I propose allocating up to $15 million of that for maintaining status quo LP reward incentives. That is a huge percentage, but unused funds may be returned after the 90 day reboot, and our huge mistakes require huge fixes.
Combined with the 1:1 MP matching, total LP rewards are increased and TVL may respond by growing accordingly, deepening the critical market depth required to attract whales whose size is actually size.
D. Accelerate long-term competitiveness with innovative features unique to GMX:
-
gmxUSD.
Allow minting, under conditions prescribed by ChaosLabs, a native stablecoin backed by GLV/GM and staked GMX collateral.
GmxUSD collateral should emulate the LLAMA soft-liquidation features designed for and successfully used by crvUSD, described at docs dot curve dot finance/crvUSD/amm/.
Using such Lending Liquidating Automated Market Maker Algorithms preserves usersâ capital, allows for safer leverage/looping, and enhances the resilience of the gmxUSD peg.
GmxUSD should be integrated into the decentralized stablecoin ecosystem, starting with crvUSD and Frax. Such partnerships allow creation of new money legos and opportunities to grow TVL, eg using Resupply, YieldBasis, Convex, and Curveâs massive market depth.
Once gmxUSD is paired with crvUSD and Frax, 20% incoming of Treasury funding should be to used to buy and lock CRV and/or CVX, as their use in Gauge Weight voting ensures deep liquidity stays in these stablepools, which are critical for peg resilience.
In addition to using GMX protocol-owned vlCRV and vlCVX for gmxUSD gauge votes, an additional 10% of incoming Treasury funding must be directed to purchasing at current market rates (via Votium or whatever) 3rd party votes for Curve pool reward allocations.
Using both owned and rented votes hedges our bets and allows quicker, more flexible and appropriately adaptive reactions in cases of rapidly changing market conditions, such as a depeg, hack, or exploit in one of our paired/pooled stablecoin partners.
To jumpstart GMX accumulation and compounding of vlCRV/vlCVX, I propose to allocate $1,000,000 for purchasing, via a 60 day TWAP in our native GM pools, of both tokens upon the initial testnet release of gmxUSD. -
gmxLOAN.
A simplified gmxUSD minting interface, offering Alchemix-style self-repaying loans with additional best-in-class features like liquidation protection. Interest rates should be fixed, using a mechanism equivalent to Inverse Financeâs battle-tested FiRM (Fixed Rate Market). -
Mitigate overeliance on Circle.
Circle as a single point of failure is not compatible with GMXâs long-term viability. USDC is an existential threat to GMX given our current hyper-reliance on this single, centralized, politicized, and for-profit entity.
After gmxUSD gains sufficent traction (according to ChaosLabs), it must begin to replace USDC as the projects native stablecoin, regardless of short-term concerns regarding liquidity fragmentation, etc. -
GMXchain-A (Arbitrum).
We should remain aligned with Ethereum and Arbitrum while ensuring minimum fees and fast, flawless, good-faith execution (no MEV, etc) by creating our own L3 chain on Arbitrum.
GMXchain-A will inherit the security of Ethereum and speed of Arbitrum by running its own validators on its own chain one layer above Arbitrum.
GMXchain-A validators must stake a minium of 13,250 GMX, which is 0.1% of max emission. This will create a new incentive against the stakers voting to expand the supply, as validators will not rationally desire more competing nodes sharing their fees.
Transaction fees on GMXchain-A are paid in ETH to align with Ethereumâs and Arbitrumâs gas fee structure.
GMXchain-A validators will run HyperEVM, an open-source high-performance version of the EVM capable of about 100,000 TPS.
Existing GMX code should run flawlessly on HyperEVM, but letâs allocate $50,000 for an extra audit to make sure. -
GMXchain-B (Base).
We should attempt alignment with Ethereum and Base, ensuring minimum fees and fast, flawless, good-faith execution (no MEV, etc) by creating our own L3 chain on Base. By (literally) A/B testing two L3s, we hedge our bets and have two very fast new horses in the perp race.
GMXchain-B will inherit the security of Ethereum and speed of Base by running its own validators on its own chain one layer above Base.
GMXchain-B validators must stake a minium of 13,250 GMX, which is 0.1% of max emission. This will create a new incentive against the stakers voting to expand the supply and remove GMX from circulation, increasing (ceteris parabus) staking rewards.
Transaction fees on GMXchain-B are paid in ETH to align with Ethereumâs and Baseâs gas fee structure.
GMXchain-B validators will run Firedancer client software, an open-source high-performance version of Solana capable of about 1,000,000 TPS.
Existing GMXSOL code should run flawlessly on Firedancer, but letâs allocate $50,000 for an extra audit to make sure. -
DoubleZero.
To ensure all GMXchain validators stay competitive with ultra-low latency centralized markets such as Binance and Coinbase, the Treasury should, upon the release of GMXchain testnets, TWAP over 60 days $100,000 into 2Z, the token of DoubleZero.
These 2Z tokens may then be distributed to validators as a subsidy to bootstrap both GMXchains onto the DoubleZero CDN, which is âpurpose-built networking for high-performance distributed systems.â
GMX web frontend and RPC servers should also be migrated to DoubleZero, as soon as possible.
II. Proposal author compensation.
- This proposal took 100s of hours to create, and is based on decades of elite multidisciplinary education combined with crypto-specific experience. If executing this roadmap to GMXâs eventual recovery and ascendancy is a success I will be responsible for billions of additional TVL accrual.
- Fair compensation to me should be based on three all time high milestones for the GMX token as measured in USD, ETH, and BTC (48hr volume-weighted average price, so manipulative spikes wonât count).
- I would like to be paid in GMX, in increments sufficient to run a GMXchain validator, IE 13,250 tokens, upon the price of the GMX token reaching all time highs in USD and/or ETH and/or BTC. Maximum treasury exposure would thus be 39,750 GMX (0.3% of maximum emission).