The Great Recovery: Restore, Reboot, & Accelerate GMX

[BluBerri]

The Great Recovery: Restore, Reboot, & Accelerate GMX

• RESTORE: multiplier point incentives and eth dividends
• REBOOT: recognize the system has crashed into a downward spiral failure mode and mitigate accumulated/ongoing damage with a hard reset
• ACCELERATE: use our healthy treasury to speed up the short-term recovery process and add long-term game-changing features

Preamble:

Everyone, especially whales, who voted for the greedy short-sighted embarrassing failures which removed MultiplierPoints, changed ETH dividends to GMX, and enabled the retarded Buy Back & Dump fiasco:

Please, eat crow instead of talking here. We tried things your way and thus missed out on the greatest Bitcoin and DeFi Perp bull market in history. Kindly stay out of our
attempts to fix the damage you have caused. Thanks in advance.

The removal/vesting/dumping of MPs (supposedly for the sake of ‘Muh nEw bUYerS’) was an obnoxiously obvious way for sell-out OGs to move on to greener pastures like Hyperliquid,
while gaslighting us about the theoretical advantages of changing bear-tested and demonstrably successful project tokenomics. Shame on everyone who got jealous of the short-lived little pump GNS enjoyed after switching to the pathetic shopworn gimmick of token buy-backs, and thus insisted we likewise shoot ourselves in the foot by copying them in regrettable a fit of insecurity.

Spare us the toxic positivity; do not insult our intelligence (this post contains 0.00% LLM slop) by whining about overdue acknowledgement that GMX’s current trajectory is
overwhelmingly negative, from token price to TVL to the price of Blueberry NFTs!

I. The path to GMX recovery:

A. Restore the original MP ponzinomics with default ETH distributions.
Add a new option to receive dividends in any GLV or GM pool or pure Bitcoin. Accept the fact our crappy experiment in GMX buy-back-and-dumps replacing MPs and ETH dividends is a total failure.

B. No changes to maximum emission.
We have a $35 million Treasury for exactly this kind of do-or-die, now-or-never situation. Expanding token supply would send the worst possible message by confirming the market’s current perception that GMX is easily manipulated, almost worthless trash.
Reassuring current and potential stakeholders that GMX’s total supply is set in stone is a small, necessary signal within a larger reorganization context sufficient to regain competitive status conducive to positive future growth expectations.

C. Accelerate short-term recovery with a 90 day hard reboot of shock therapy:

1. Double MP rewards.
   Use 50% of the Treasury’s GMX tokens to double incentives for MP accumulation/staking by converting Treasury GMX to MPs and matching users’ earned MPs 1:1.
   That’s about $3 million going directly to active users/stakers who desire long-term alignment with a rebooted GMX project. Bonus MPs should be kept available until they run out, whether it takes more or less than 90 days.
2. Fee Holiday.
   During the 90 day reboot, cut fees to the exact ChaosLab-specified minimum required to prevent wash trading, economic attacks, etc.
   This (extremely controversial) brief period of austerity greatly reduces staking rewards, but GMX stakers/voters deserve temporary pain punishing, via slashed dividends, previous bad governance decisions. They can accept 1:1 boosted MPs as a substitute, or GTFO.
   The fee holiday is classic shock therapy; it divides holders into those willing to accept short term pain for long term gain, and expunges rent-collecting bad actors who have essentially been farming loyal holders by vesting and dumping MPs into diminishing exit liquidity.
   For all the blather about ‘buying success’ via cheesy marketing, competitions, and other cringe try-hard inorganic BS, the ultimate advertisement is simply a better product. For traders, that means astonishingly low fees, deep liquidity, out-of-band incentives, and reliable security.
   We obviously need to make sacrifices to earn back customers and stakeholders, most of whom have understandably abandoned GMX for other projects. We must persuade them to return and stay by offering a better environment for traders, holders, and everyone else.
3. Maintain current Liquidity Provider incentives to avoid loss of TVL.
   For 90 days, replace reduced GLV/GM staking rewards using non-GMX Treasury funds so LPs’ fees will not be changed by the bare-minimum Fee Holiday.
   Treasury has $30 million in non-GMX tokens; I propose allocating up to $15 million of that for maintaining status quo LP reward incentives. That is a huge percentage, but unused funds may be returned after the 90 day reboot, and our huge mistakes require huge fixes.
   Combined with the 1:1 MP matching, total LP rewards are increased and TVL may respond by growing accordingly, deepening the critical market depth required to attract whales whose size is actually size.

D. Accelerate long-term competitiveness with innovative features unique to GMX:

1. gmxUSD.
   Allow minting, under conditions prescribed by ChaosLabs, a native stablecoin backed by GLV/GM and staked GMX collateral.
   GmxUSD collateral should emulate the LLAMA soft-liquidation features designed for and successfully used by crvUSD, described at docs dot curve dot finance/crvUSD/amm/.
   Using such Lending Liquidating Automated Market Maker Algorithms preserves users’ capital, allows for safer leverage/looping, and enhances the resilience of the gmxUSD peg.
   GmxUSD should be integrated into the decentralized stablecoin ecosystem, starting with crvUSD and Frax. Such partnerships allow creation of new money legos and opportunities to grow TVL, eg using Resupply, YieldBasis, Convex, and Curve’s massive market depth.
   Once gmxUSD is paired with crvUSD and Frax, 20% incoming of Treasury funding should be to used to buy and lock CRV and/or CVX, as their use in Gauge Weight voting ensures deep liquidity stays in these stablepools, which are critical for peg resilience.
   In addition to using GMX protocol-owned vlCRV and vlCVX for gmxUSD gauge votes, an additional 10% of incoming Treasury funding must be directed to purchasing at current market rates (via Votium or whatever) 3rd party votes for Curve pool reward allocations.
   Using both owned and rented votes hedges our bets and allows quicker, more flexible and appropriately adaptive reactions in cases of rapidly changing market conditions, such as a depeg, hack, or exploit in one of our paired/pooled stablecoin partners.
   To jumpstart GMX accumulation and compounding of vlCRV/vlCVX, I propose to allocate $1,000,000 for purchasing, via a 60 day TWAP in our native GM pools, of both tokens upon the initial testnet release of gmxUSD.

2. gmxLOAN.
   A simplified gmxUSD minting interface, offering Alchemix-style self-repaying loans with additional best-in-class features like liquidation protection. Interest rates should be fixed, using a mechanism equivalent to Inverse Finance’s battle-tested FiRM (Fixed Rate Market).

3. Mitigate overeliance on Circle.
   Circle as a single point of failure is not compatible with GMX’s long-term viability. USDC is an existential threat to GMX given our current hyper-reliance on this single, centralized, politicized, and for-profit entity.
   After gmxUSD gains sufficent traction (according to ChaosLabs), it must begin to replace USDC as the projects native stablecoin, regardless of short-term concerns regarding liquidity fragmentation, etc.

4. GMXchain-A (Arbitrum).
   We should remain aligned with Ethereum and Arbitrum while ensuring minimum fees and fast, flawless, good-faith execution (no MEV, etc) by creating our own L3 chain on Arbitrum.
   GMXchain-A will inherit the security of Ethereum and speed of Arbitrum by running its own validators on its own chain one layer above Arbitrum.
   GMXchain-A validators must stake a minium of 13,250 GMX, which is 0.1% of max emission. This will create a new incentive against the stakers voting to expand the supply, as validators will not rationally desire more competing nodes sharing their fees.
   Transaction fees on GMXchain-A are paid in ETH to align with Ethereum’s and Arbitrum’s gas fee structure.
   GMXchain-A validators will run HyperEVM, an open-source high-performance version of the EVM capable of about 100,000 TPS.
   Existing GMX code should run flawlessly on HyperEVM, but let’s allocate $50,000 for an extra audit to make sure.

5. GMXchain-B (Base).
   We should attempt alignment with Ethereum and Base, ensuring minimum fees and fast, flawless, good-faith execution (no MEV, etc) by creating our own L3 chain on Base. By (literally) A/B testing two L3s, we hedge our bets and have two very fast new horses in the perp race.
   GMXchain-B will inherit the security of Ethereum and speed of Base by running its own validators on its own chain one layer above Base.
   GMXchain-B validators must stake a minium of 13,250 GMX, which is 0.1% of max emission. This will create a new incentive against the stakers voting to expand the supply and remove GMX from circulation, increasing (ceteris parabus) staking rewards.
   Transaction fees on GMXchain-B are paid in ETH to align with Ethereum’s and Base’s gas fee structure.
   GMXchain-B validators will run Firedancer client software, an open-source high-performance version of Solana capable of about 1,000,000 TPS.
   Existing GMXSOL code should run flawlessly on Firedancer, but let’s allocate $50,000 for an extra audit to make sure.

6. DoubleZero.
   To ensure all GMXchain validators stay competitive with ultra-low latency centralized markets such as Binance and Coinbase, the Treasury should, upon the release of GMXchain testnets, TWAP over 60 days $100,000 into 2Z, the token of DoubleZero.
   These 2Z tokens may then be distributed to validators as a subsidy to bootstrap both GMXchains onto the DoubleZero CDN, which is “purpose-built networking for high-performance distributed systems.”
   GMX web frontend and RPC servers should also be migrated to DoubleZero, as soon as possible.

II. Proposal author compensation.

• This proposal took 100s of hours to create, and is based on decades of elite multidisciplinary education combined with crypto-specific experience. If executing this roadmap to GMX’s eventual recovery and ascendancy is a success I will be responsible for billions of additional TVL accrual.
• Fair compensation to me should be based on three all time high milestones for the GMX token as measured in USD, ETH, and BTC (48hr volume-weighted average price, so manipulative spikes won’t count).
• I would like to be paid in GMX, in increments sufficient to run a GMXchain validator, IE 13,250 tokens, upon the price of the GMX token reaching all time highs in USD and/or ETH and/or BTC. Maximum treasury exposure would thus be 39,750 GMX (0.3% of maximum emission).

[the4hodlmen]

Best proposal in long long while. Not exactly more detail i’d like to discuss rn. But to let you know that i completely agree and feel your/our pain.

[Saurabh]

Hey @BluBerri, Appreciate the proposal. The team will review it and share their feedback soon!

[woofbark]

I do think going back to the original pay out model would be best, we tried the alternative and now its t8me to go back to the original idea for GMX. As for mp it was to what I could see those who were new to the platform who were complaining those that bought GMX early had an unfair disadvantage well I think that advantage should a perk of being a long term holder

[Tano]

Hi Mark, btcfever or BluBerri!

Thanks for this proposal, a few things to clear out.

Opening your proposal with an attack will not help you move things within the community, the governance forums are a open way for the community to discuss things, so even if you’re opinions don’t align with them, let’s not attack eachother and keep it friendly and I hope everyone does!

Not only have the whales voted for the removal of the multiplier points, but the whole community was in favour if doing so, so just to clear that out, as the majority of the votes were in favour of removing it, weird way how it works aye?

1.A
I am pretty sure the community is still in favour of not changing tokenomics to the previously implemented MP/ETH rewards, so buybacks most likely will stay, but if the community agrees with you (don’t think they will, then its up to you to put this to vote). The lack of price actions has nothing to do with MP points being removed but the growth not being there.

Also every decent project is literally doing buybacks now, so can we change the distribute to keep it in treasury or something else, sure, but up for more discussions.

B. Emissions I agree with you, shouldn’t be changed.
C. Seems a little overboard and as I am not a fan of MP points, this shouldn’t be executed at all. I am not sure also how lower fees instantly bring back people to GMX but if you have a plan/idea around that feel free to let us know! So what happens if the fees are lowered and trades are not coming back and TVL doesn’t increase? It seems your ideas about doing something doesn’t have a concrete plan of bringing back users, you still need a solid plan to execute which I still don’t see here. If GMX were to spend millions in incentives to LPs, and traders do not come back we have serious issues while our LPs are flocking away, don’t seem great imo, so would like to clarify some more information on this end.

D. 1.
Fan of gmxUSD yes, but not sure how it fits within the roadmap and timelines, also how do you think about all these partnerships working out? Can you shine a bit more light into this? I also thing stacking crv or cvx shouldn’t be a priority and there’s other ways to make a stablecoin really be stable.

D2. Makes sense to do with gmxUSD yes
D3. Not sure what’s this all about? Seems you have quite some anger towards them but they’re still the most widely used stablecoin in crypto and in the platform so this doesn’t make any sense to change for now.

D.4. Can you go more into depth on how a HyperEVM validator setup works on a Layer3, never heard about it, but maybe you can expand.

D.5 same for here, please expand more on this

D. 6 seems like a blatant shill for 2Z, and their chart even looks worse than ours and they’re only live for a few months lol, so not a fan of TWAP here for that specific reason. And I fail to see what benefit they would bring to us? Could you please expand on this?

II.

Seems a little bit overboard that this took more than 100hs to make, so not a fan of the compensation plans. You’re also saying you will bring billions in TVL, but I fail to see how these changes will have effect and what specific effects they will bring, but you can go deeper into this to clear it out! I also don’t think increase in TVL is what we need, we need a increase in volumes and fees.

Also next time, please yap a bit less and post more concrete stuff and points to solidify your stances, cause now you just seem an arrogant human being trying to push his points across people, and being very very aggresive.

But thank you for posting this!

[woofbark]

maybe we could do all payouts in stable coins or atleast be given the option!

[yellow]

There are some good points and bad points in this proposal; some of the good points being previously discussed in other threads.

The consensus is:

• Do not increase GMX token issuance, that would send the price to 0. Maybe best would be to “enshrine” it in the contract, to be future proof.
• The MP and ETH fees were actually better than what we have now. This should be a separate proposal.
• What we need most are discounts based on the number of GMX tokens held (I proposed a table in another discussion)
• Spend in marketing + BD to drive partnerships that bring TVL / protocol usage.

PS: I don’t see why ideas by contributors should be paid… it would make a bad precedent imho.

[0xjunwei]

With regards to the payment fair but the sum requested seem unreasonable for the proposed effort/work done.

[Jonezee]

gmxUSD, gmxLOAN, gmxCHAIN. These are not things you simply implement in the timespan of a few months; it’s more like a wish list.

My recommendation would be to select the one you believe, and can successfully argue, would bring the greatest positive effect to GMX and its holders. Then flesh out a development proposal for that specific idea, skipping the abrasiveness.