Since the establishment of the Arbitrum DAO, an active voice but not voting power has been maintained for GMX, facilitated by community members and delegates. There was an extended period of discussion in the Arbitrum DAO about whether and how builders should wield their voting power within it, resulting in diverse perspectives but seemingly now accepted that they can but should be permitted to.
With the recent approval of the Short-Term Incentive Program via snapshot (link, we anticipate a significant surge in activity within the Arbitrum DAO. Therefore, it is crucial to ensure that GMX’s voting power is now effectively represented for this and other critical decisions.
Looking further ahead, the delegation of GMX’s ARB tokens could follow several potential paths, and it is prudent for the community to select a direction:
- Delegate to Contributors: This option involves entrusting individuals who are well-versed in GMX’s interests and the broader ecosystem, and who have established effective communication with the Arbitrum Foundation and DAO Delegates. However, it means concentrating this responsibility into fewer hands.
- Direct Voting by GMX DAO: This option seeks to establish a mechanism enabling the GMX community to directly participate in voting through snapshots, essentially embodying a pure form of democracy. While this approach offers a direct connection between the DAOs, it may somewhat reduce GMX’s leverage to express a consensus position and could lead to a significant volume of voting activity among our DAO members, potentially detracting from discussions about our own governance.
- Community Multisig: This proposition involves electing community members to constitute a multisig group responsible for reviewing and voting on proposals deemed most beneficial for GMX, Arbitrum, and the broader ecosystem. This model resembles representative democracy and could include rotating elections. There might also be room for the creation of public programs to foster more community-led committees within the GMX DAO.
- Don’t Delegate: Opting for this approach would mean GMX refrains from utilizing its voting power within the Arbitrum DAO. Instead, GMX would continue to rely on the voices of contributors and the community to convey moral authority, with the tokens themselves serving as a testament to our commitment.
Immediate Action: Except for option 4, all the aforementioned options will require time to implement and should be thoroughly discussed before a decision is made. To address this, this proposal suggests an immediate interim step: electing a single member delegate, who will serve until a long-term plan is decided upon and implemented, or for a maximum of 6 months (unless extended by a vote or removed by our DAO governance). This way, we can ensure our presence in Arbitrum governance decisions.
Recommended Guidelines: While delegates must exercise their voting rights as they see fit, it is advisable for our DAO to express certain principles we hope they will consider:
- It is encourage delegates to vote for proposals, including on those that may align directly or interectly with GMX’s interests, financially or otherwise.
- Advocate for the exercise of voting power on proposals from protocol partners collaborating with GMX to ensure equitable governance.
- Whenever possible, encourage delegates to either abstain from voting or vote to abstain on proposals from competitors to GMX to avoid taking a stance. In cases of especially contentious proposals, we should express our concerns through governance forums and voting notes.
- Suggest that delegates seek feedback from the governance community when appropriate, but ultimately the DAO trust them with the responsibility to exercise their judgment.
Candidacy: Time is limited to establish delegation, but a 5-day nomination window and a 5-day voting period should provide ample time for this appointment. We strongly encourage community members to present their candidacies.
Furthermore, the proposer of this post (coinflipcanada) will create a separate post within this thread regarding a potential candidacy. This candidacy is contingent on the community’s decision to have a core contributor fill this role temporarily. It is the proposer’s aspiration and preference that another esteemed member of our community (or a group) garners the support of the community as we continue to develop our community governance.